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Rethinking the Target Corollary:
The Effects of Social Distance, Perceived Exposure,
and Perceived Predispositions on First-Person and
Third-Person Perceptions
This study examines the effects of social distance, perceived exposure, and per-
ceived predispositions on perceived media effects for desirable and undesir-
able health messages. It finds support for the effect social distance as tradi-
tionally measured; that is, groups that are more socially distant from the self,
like the public, are perceived to be more affected by cigarette ads than close
groups, such as friends. However, individual measures of respondents’ social
distance from any given comparison group generally are unrelated to per-
ceived effects on the group. The influence of a group’s perceived exposure on
perceived message effects is confirmed for cigarette ads but not for desirable
messages. Perceived attitudes of comparison groups toward message-relevant
behaviors emerge as a factor that deserves inclusion in models of perceived
effects.
Keywords: third-person effect; first-person effect; social distance; exposure;
prosocial messages; stereotypes
The explanatory framework for the third-person effect has expanded consid-
erably since the effect was first described by Davison (1983) as the tendency
to believe that media effects will be greater for others than for oneself. Among
the first factors to be identified (Perloff, 1993) as contributing to first-person
and third-person effects were message desirability (Chapin,2000;Gunther &
Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992; Hoorens & Ruiter, 1996; Innes &
Zeitz, 1988; White, 1997; White & Dillon, 2000) and social distance between
the self and comparison groups (Cohen & Davis, 1991; Cohen, Mutz, Price, &
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Gunther, 1988; Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995; Gibbon & Durkin, 1995; Gunther,
1991; White, 1997).
Most third-person effect studies, especially early on, dealt with messages
that would be seen as “not smart to be influenced by” (Gunther & Mundy,
1993); however, it was found that the effect diminished or reversed into a
first-person effect when the media message in question was prosocial or could
have desirable consequences. As for social distance, it was implicitly recog-
nized as a key variable by Davison (1983), and after several studies, the posi-
tive relationship between perceived media effects and the social distance of
the self from the “others” was enshrined as the “social distance corollary.”
The social distance corollary was challenged by findings that perceived
exposure of a group to a message was a better predictor of perceived effects
than perceived similarity to the group (Eveland, Nathanson, Detenber, &
McLeod, 1999; McLeod, Detenber, & Eveland, 2001; McLeod, Eveland, &
Nathanson, 1997). Thus was born the “target corollary”—to the extent that a
group is perceived as the target of a type of media content, perceived effects
on them will be greater. Unfortunately, the target corollary has been empiri-
cally incorporated almost exclusively in work by Eveland and McLeod and
their colleagues. Others have discussed the target corollary but mainly in
terms of its untenability as an alternate explanation for their findings
(Meirick, 2004; Scharrer, 2002).
Despite the strong results of the target corollary studies cited above, the
effect has been tested only for antisocial music lyrics. It has not been tested
for messages where there would likely be less perceived variance in exposure,
nor has it been tested for desirable messages. There is some evidence to sug-
gest that the target corollary might not hold for positive messages (Meirick,
2002), perhaps because of incompatibility between beliefs about a group’s
exposure and (heretofore underexamined) beliefs about a group’s predisposi-
tions toward the message’s advocated behavior.
This most recent suggested factor in first-person and third-person effects
draws from a logic similar to that of the target corollary. At its core, the target
corollary relies on the idea that people “observe or infer a relationship
between certain types of media content and certain types of people. For
instance, most people could guess that romantic comedies are more popular
among women, whereas action movies are more popular among men”
(Eveland et al., 1999,p. 281).This kind of belief is stereotypical in that stereo-
types are “cognitive structures that contain our knowledge, beliefs, and
expectations about a social group” (Kunda, 1999, p. 315). Recent studies sug-
gest that other stereotypical beliefs, such as beliefs about comparison groups’
predispositions, may play a role in perceived effects on those groups (Meirick,
2004; Scharrer, 2002); however, evidence is tentative and indirect so far.
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The current study attempts to bring all the aforementioned factors
together for the first time. It will examine the relative explanatory power of
social distance, perceived exposure, and perceived predispositions for the
perceived effects of positive and negative messages concerning tobacco use
and drinking and driving. In preparation for doing so, it discusses each of
these factors in turn, paying particular attention to areas where they may
come into conflict and where the findings in the literature are inconclusive.
Battle of the Corollaries: Social Distance Versus Target
The social distance corollary typically has been demonstrated by showing
a pattern of increasing effects of undesirable messages as comparison groups
grow more general or more geographically distant from the self. For instance,
Gibbon and Durkin (1995) found such a pattern as the locus of effects moved
from self to family to neighbors to other state residents to other Australian
citizens to others in general. Some have found similar patterns (Cohen et al,
1988; Gunther, 1991; White, 1997); however, others have not (e.g., Cohen &
Davis, 1991). Other conceptions of social distance have used a reference
group approach, conceiving of comparison groups as in-groups or out-groups
based on, for example, politics (Duck et al., 1995; Meirick, 2004) or race
(Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002; Sharrer, 2002). In this approach, in-groups are
seen as reacting much as the self does, whereas out-groups are contrasted
with the self. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and social catego-
rization theory (Turner,1985) posited that this is done to enhance self-esteem
through the part of the self-concept drawn from reference group
identification and disidentification.
There were often anomalous findings in studies examining the social dis-
tance corollary, regardless of how distance was conceived. However, the
greater blow to the corollary came in the form of the target corollary (Eveland
et al., 1999;McLeod et al., 1997,2001).These studies were perhaps the first to
include individual-level measures of the social distance that respondents
perceived from the comparison groups; that is, respondents were asked how
similar they thought they were to the average member of a wide array of com-
parison groups—some arranged along traditional lines of generality, others
along lines of age or education. In addition, they measured perceived expo-
sure for each comparison group. A series of regression equations showed per-
ceived exposure to be a much better predictor of perceived effects on
comparison groups than social distance.
The logic of the target corollary is that effects estimates for others are
based on perceived exposure in line with a lay theory of media effects
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resembling the hypodermic model: People observe negative attitudes and
behaviors, they observe messages that would seem to encourage those behav-
iors, and they make a causal assumption, as people are wont to do, about
media effects (Eveland et al., 1999; McLeod et al., 2001). The logic works well
for negative messages, and thus far, the four types of messages examined
have been all undesirable, all concerning violent or misogynistic music lyrics.
As McLeod et al. (2001) acknowledged, the target corollary needs to be exam-
ined with a broader range of messages.
Indeed, the logic above would seem to break down for messages intended
to discourage negative behavior. If an observer believes a group uses a lot of
drugs and is asked about the effects on that group of an antidrug message to
which the observer believes they have been exposed, the observer would be
hard-pressed to assume that exposure equals influence. Another consider-
ation is that prosocial messages tend to be targeted toward groups considered
“at risk” for the behavior they discourage, groups that may be perceived as
prone to misbehavior. Along those lines, Meirick (2002) found that college
student respondents thought their fellow students would be less affected
than the general public by public service announcements (PSAs) about drunk
driving, wearing seat belts, and avoiding tobacco, most of which are, in fact,
targeted toward young adults. This study did not measure perceived expo-
sure, and it is possible that the public would have been perceived as more
exposed to the PSAs, contrary to reality. However, the results did not square
with the social distance corollary, either, if we assume that the student
respondents felt closer to other students than to the general public.
What else could explain the pattern of results Meirick (2002) found? A
deeper answer may lie in going further down the path blazed by the target
corollary. If perceived exposure of social groups is relevant to their perceived
effects, then other beliefs about the social groups may be as well—and these
beliefs may have conflicting influences on perceived message impact. Per-
haps perceptions of other college students as prone to risky behavior placed
limits on the usual self-enhancing pattern of pro-in-group bias that charac-
terizes the social distance corollary. Biernat, Vescio, and Green (1996)
observed similar tendencies among sorority and fraternity members, who
rejected negative stereotypes for themselves but accepted them as valid for
sorority and fraternity members in general. In a sense, this would be an
example of a social reality constraint on self-enhancement similar to the
“limits/possibilities” approach of Peiser and Peter (2001). The difference is
that where Peiser and Peter were concerned principally with the perceiver’s
situation, the current research is concerned with perceptions of the compari-
son groups’ predispositions; in other words, stereotypical beliefs.
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Stereotypical Beliefs: Beyond Perceived Exposure
Knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about social groups or categories are
organized as cognitive structures called stereotypes. As Hamilton and
Sherman (1994) pointed out, people rely on stereotypes of social groups as a
cognitive efficiency to help simplify and make sense of the information-rich
social environment (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), and they even may
draw on stereotypes automatically (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989). Moreover,
as mentioned above, people may derive some of their self-esteem from catego-
rizing people into in-groups and out-groups and holding beliefs about the
superiority of the group to which they belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner,
1985).
Stereotypes are conceived of as containing “lists of unrelated attributes”
(Kunda, 1999,p. 315) that may vary in their degree of accuracy and typicality
across members of a culture. By this definition, a belief about a social group’s
exposure to a message is a stereotypical belief. However, by no means is it the
only belief a person is likely to have about a social group.Many beliefs about a
group will be irrelevant to the perceived effects of a message; however, others
may not be.
Some researchers have begun exploring other stereotypical beliefs beyond
perceived exposure. McLeod et al. (2001) measured the effect of perceived
common sense of oneself and of different groups on the perceived effects of
rap and metal music. They found that common sense was related to perceived
effects on the self but was unrelated to perceived effects on others; effects on
others were predicted almost exclusively by perceived exposure. However, as
they acknowledged, there may be other relevant antecedent variables;
indeed, their rationale was based not only on beliefs about exposure but also
on beliefs about attitudes and behaviors: “Individuals are aware of negative
media content as well as negative social attitudes and behaviors [italics
added] and believe that exposure to negative content leads to negative
effects” (Eveland et al., 1999,p. 297).Their rationale was meant to assert that
the negative attitudes and behaviors would be seen as effects of the content.
However, it also could be argued that perceived effects of a message will be
affected by the extent to which a group is perceived as being predisposed
toward a behavior the message advocates (or opposes). Indeed, the funda-
mental attribution error (Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) argued that peo-
ple generally tend to make dispositional attributions about outcomes experi-
enced by others. Beliefs about such predispositions would be much more
specific than common sense, and attitude research has found that
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predictiveness increases with specificity, a principle that may apply here
(Fishbein & Azjen, 1981).
Scharrer (2002) set out to explore the effect of stereotypes on perceived
effects on others. She observed greater perceived effects of violence on minor-
ities than on Whites, on the poor than on the rich, on the less educated than
the more educated, on the urban than the suburban. She explained these
findings as indicative of negative stereotypes of marginalized out-groups.
She also found that men and children were perceived as more affected by
media violence—and rightly so, she noted, citing the findings of media vio-
lence researchers (Paik & Comstock, 1994). In this case, it was not a matter of
stereotypes, she argued; it was a matter of being right. Under Kunda’s (1999)
definition, we would consider beliefs about all these groups as stereotypes.
Scharrer (2002) made an appealing case for the role of stereotypes in the
third-person effect; however, as she acknowledged, her evidence was indirect.
The study had no measures of racism or other quantification of perceived
similarity to the target groups that would presumably reflect in-group identi-
fication or negative out-group stereotyping. As with the advocates of the tar-
get corollary, her rationale discussed the perceived predispositions of others;
however, she took the step of posing them as a reason that the groups may be
seen as more vulnerable to media effects. “Thus, respondents may view mar-
ginalized groups as more prone to violence and therefore more vulnerable to
the effects of television violence” (p. 686). She drew on a nearly identical
notion for men: “(Respondents) may consider that social norms make physi-
cal aggressiveness more acceptable and common for men compared to
women” (p. 688).
Scharrer (2002) assumed (correctly, it would seem) that men, minorities,
the poor, the less educated, and the urban would be stereotypically perceived
as predisposed to violence. Still, to make the case stronger, it would make
sense to attempt to measure perceived attributes of target groups that might
be relevant to their susceptibility to certain messages.
In his study of the perceived effects of political ads on partisans, Meirick
(2004) used difference scores in perceived ideology measures to represent the
inferred political distance between a candidate and a comparison group.
Although he viewed this measure as an indication of the perceived desirabil-
ity of the candidate’s ad for a group, it also could be considered a measure of a
comparison group’s attitude toward a candidate. It was expected that the
closer the candidate and group were perceived to be, the greater would be the
perceived effects on the group. Significant partial correlations were found for
just two of the six cases; however, an across-group correlation showed that
the greater the mean distance between a candidate and a group, the smaller
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the mean perceived effects of a candidate’s ad. Although these findings may
seem somewhat weak, consider the measure: a difference score of ideology,
which is in itself a concept the public may not reliably grasp (Converse, 1962).
Perhaps a stronger measure would find stronger effects.
These results, combined with Scharrer’s (2002) indirect evidence and
McLeod et al.’s (2001) call for further testing, lead us to our hypotheses.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis predicts that a third-person effect will be found for
cigarette advertising. Similar results have been found by others for this type
of message (Banning, 2001; Meirick, 2002) and for undesirable messages in
general (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000). This a priori judgment of message
desirability is probably justified.
Hypothesis 1: Perceived effects of cigarette advertising will be greater for
the comparison groups than for the self.
Conversely, first-person effects should be found for antitobacco and anti-
drunk-driving messages.
Hypothesis 2: Perceived effects of antitobacco advertisements and anti-
drunk-driving PSAs will be greater for the self than for the comparison
groups.
Next, we turn to the corollaries. Based on previous (albeit mixed) support
for the social distance corollary, it should be in evidence here. The traditional
test is comparing perceived effects between comparison groups, seeing on an
aggregate level if, for instance, the sample perceived greater effects on their
friends or on the public.The more general or geographically distant the group
is, the greater effects for undesirable messages should be (and the smaller the
effects of desirable messages should be). In addition, as Eveland et al. (1999)
did, we can test the relationship between individually measured perceived
similarity and perceived effects for each comparison group. We would expect,
for instance, that respondents who feel relatively close to the public would
perceive smaller effects of cigarette ads on the public than those respondents
who feel distant from the public. The relationship between perceived similar-
ity and perceived effects should be negative for undesirable messages and
positive for desirable messages.
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Hypothesis 3: Perceived effects of cigarette advertising will increase as the
social distance from the self of the comparison group increases.
Hypothesis 4: Perceived effects of antitobacco advertisements and anti-
drunk-driving PSAs will decrease as the social distance from the self of
the comparison group increases.
The target corollary repeatedly has been found for undesirable messages.
Based on its logic, we would expect it to be found here for cigarette
advertising.
Hypothesis 5: A comparison group’s perceived exposure will be positively
related to the perceived effects of cigarette advertising on the group.
However, based on the incompatibility of the target corollary’s logic with
desirable messages and on suggestive findings (Meirick, 2002), we would not
expect the target corollary to hold for the desirable messages in this study.
Although we cannot test what amounts to a null hypothesis, we can hypothe-
size that the predictive power of perceived exposure will be greater for unde-
sirable messages than for desirable messages.
Hypothesis 6: A comparison group’s perceived exposure will be more
strongly related to the perceived effects of cigarette advertising on the
group than to the perceived effects of antitobacco ads or anti-drunk-
driving PSAs on the group.
Effects on the self have not yet been addressed here. McLeod et al. (2001)
found that one’s own perceived exposure to antisocial lyrics had no relation-
ship with perceived effects on the self. However, Peiser and Peter (2001)
found that one’s self-reported frequency of television viewing was associated
with positive (purposiveness) and negative (habitual) self-ascribed viewing
orientations.
Research Question 1: How will one’s perceived exposure be related to per-
ceived effects on the self?
The evidence for the influence of perceived predispositions on perceived
media effects is inconclusive and indirect, but suggestive. Also consider that
the theoretical arguments for the influence of perceived exposure and of
racial and gender stereotypes draw on stereotypical beliefs such as perceived
predispositions. We would expect this to apply to the self in particular, based
on the fact that perceived common sense was related to perceived effects on
self but not others (McLeod et al., 2001).
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Hypothesis 7: A comparison group’s perceived predisposition toward
smoking will be positively related to perceived effects of cigarette
advertising on the group.
Hypothesis 8: A comparison group’s perceived predisposition toward
smoking will be negatively related to perceived effects of antitobacco
advertising on the group, and perceived predispositions toward drink-
ing and driving will be negatively related to perceived effects of anti-
drinking-and-driving ads toward the group.
Finally, there is the question of relative effects. Eveland et al. (1999) and
McLeod et al. (2001) showed that perceived exposure was a stronger predic-
tor of perceived effects than perceived similarity. If these two and perceived
predispositions are entered into a regression equation, what will happen?
Research Question 2: What will be the relative effects of perceived similar-
ity, perceived exposure, and perceived attitudes toward drinking or
smoking on perceived message effects?
Method
The current study set out to examine perceived effects of three messages:
cigarette advertising, antitobacco advertising, and drunk-driving PSAs. It
was decided that two of the three messages would be desirable because pre-
vious research on the target corollary had focused exclusively on undesirable
messages. The current study also examined a wide variety of comparison
groups as internal replication, as an aid in making this work comparable
with previous work on the target corollary, and because a large number of
comparison groups can lend power to an across-group analysis.
Participants and Design
Data for the current study were gathered over the course of 1 week from
323 undergraduates attending a southwestern university. The respondents
took part in exchange for credit in communication classes. Respondents were
evenly divided between the sexes with a mean age of 20.6 years (SD = 2.69);
21% identified themselves as members of racial or ethnic minorities. The cur-
rent study was administered via paper-and-pencil questionnaire with
responses entered on Scantron sheets. In that each respondent was asked
about each of the three kinds of media content and about effects on each com-
parison group, the current study employed a repeated-measures design.
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Measures
Perceived effects. Three sets of effects questions were asked, one for each
message. Respondents were asked, “How do you think (cigarette advertising/
antitobacco advertising/public service announcements about drinking and
driving) affects the likelihood that the following people will (smoke/drive
drunk)?” Responses were given on a scale of 0 (Makes me/them much less
likely to smoke/drive drunk) to 8 (Makes me/them much more likely to
smoke/drive drunk), with 4 identified as a No effect midpoint. Each of these
questions was asked for “you” and for nine comparison groups that reflected
social distance based on three dimensions: generality (your friends, univer-
sity students, the public in general), gender (males and females) and age (16-
year-olds, people your age, 30-year-olds, and 60-year-olds).
Perceived exposure. For each of the three messages, respondents were
asked, “How often do you think the following people see cigarette advertising/
antitobacco advertising/public service announcements about drinking and
driving?” Responses were given on a scale from 0 (never) to 8 (very frequently).
As above, perceived exposure estimates were obtained for the self and each of
the comparison groups.
Perceived predispositions. For both message topics, respondents were
asked, “How would you describe the following people’s attitudes toward
(smoking/driving drunk)?” Responses were given on a scale of 0 (Very unfa-
vorable toward smoking/driving drunk) to 8 (very favorable toward smok-
ing/driving drunk), with 4 identified as neutral. Perceived predispositions
were obtained for the self and each of the comparison groups.
Perceived similarity. Two items were used to assess respondents’ feelings
of similarity to and identification with the comparison groups. The first
asked, “How similar would you say you are to the average person in the fol-
lowing groups?” Answers used a scale from 0 (not at all similar) to 8 (very sim-
ilar). The second asked, “How strongly do you identify with the following
groups?” Again, a scale from 0 (not at all strongly) to 8 (very strongly) was pro-
vided for responses. For each group, the similarity and identification ratings
were summed to create a two-item scale. As an indication of reliability, corre-
lations between the two items were strong for all comparison groups, ranging
from .53 to .66 (p < .001).
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Results
Third-Person Effects
The first hypothesis predicted that perceived effects of cigarette advertis-
ing would be greater for the comparison groups than for the self. A series of
paired t tests was run and found the prediction upheld for eight of the nine
cases. See the first column of Table 1. In those eight cases, all values of t were
greater than 8 (p < .001). The only comparison group for which perceived
effects were not significantly greater was 60-year-olds (t321 = 1.40, ns). The
hypothesis was largely supported.
First-Person Effects
The second hypothesis predicted that perceived effects of antitobacco ads
and drunk-driving PSAs would be greater for the self than for the comparison
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Table 1
Perceived Effects by Message and Comparison Group
Drunk-Driving
Perceived Effect on . . . Cigarette Adsa Antitobacco Adsb PSAs
M SD M SD M SD
Yourself 2.64 2.07 2.39 2.12 2.01 1.82
Your friendsc 3.60a,c,d
*** 1.84 3.00a,d
*** 1.75 2.54a,d
*** 1.64
University students 4.68b,d
*** 1.59 3.56b,d
*** 1.36 3.26b,d
*** 1.27
Public in general 5.38c,d
*** 1.48 3.56b,d
*** 1.38 3.18b,d
*** 1.37
Males 5.06d*** 1.53 3.82d*** 1.31 3.73d*** 1.41
Females 4.69d*** 1.63 3.30d*** 1.47 2.70d*** 1.37
16-year-olds 6.05d*** 1.73 3.74d*** 1.66 3.30d*** 1.68
People your age 4.75d*** 1.52 3.64d*** 1.31 3.29d*** 1.42
30-year-olds 3.67d*** 1.64 3.44d*** 1.47 3.14d*** 1.61
60-year-olds 2.83 1.86 3.07d*** 1.90 2.71d*** 1.90
Note. PSAs = public service announcements. N = 320 to 323. Responses were given on a scale of 0
(Makes me/them much less likely to smoke/drive drunk) to 8 (Makes me/them much more likely to
smoke/drive drunk).
a. Higher scores reflect greater message-consistent persuasion for cigarette ads.
b. Lower scores reflect greater message-consistent persuasion for antitobacco ads and drunk-driv-
ing PSAs.
c. Among the first set of comparison groups, those with different lettered subscripts are signifi-
cantly different at p < .05.
***Indicates comparison group is different from the self at p < .001.
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groups. Here, message-consistent effects would be associated with lower
scores, becoming less likely to smoke or drive drunk. Again, a series of t tests
were run. See the middle and outside columns of Table 1. First-person effects
were indeed found for all nine cases for antitobacco ads (all ts > 4.9, p < .001)
and all nine cases for drunk-driving PSAs (all ts > 5.8, p < .001). Hypothesis 2
was supported.
Social Distance
Hypothesis 3 predicted that perceived effects of cigarette advertising
would increase as social distance from the self increased.The analysis for this
hypothesis began with the between-groups test, a repeated-measures
ANOVA using perceived effects on self, friends, university students, and the
public as the four levels in the distance factor. The test was significant, F(3,
315) = 152.97, p < .001,η2 = .59, and the means as shown on Table 1 indicate a
clear linear pattern of ascending effects with increasing distance, in prelimi-
nary support of Hypothesis 3. Post hoc tests showed each level significantly
different from the others.
Similar analyses were run for Hypothesis 4, which predicted decreasing
effects of antitobacco ads and drunk-driving PSAs as social distance from the
self increases. The repeated-measures ANOVA for antitobacco ads, F(3,
319) = 36.23, p < .001,η2 = .25, and for drunk-driving PSAs, F(3, 319) = 54.45,
p < .001, η2 = .34, were both significant. The means as shown in Table 1 indi-
cate a general trend of less conferred resistance to smoking and driving
drunk (reflected in higher scores) as distance from the self increases, in sup-
port of Hypothesis 4. Except for fellow university students and the public in
general, all levels are significantly different from each other.
As social distance is typically defined, its effect is affirmed. However, next
we consider its effects as measured at the individual level, in conjunction
with the effects of perceived exposure and perceived predispositions.
Perceived Similarity, Exposure, and
Predispositions for an Undesirable Message
The remaining analyses employ multiple regression for each message to
assess the relationships between perceived effects on each comparison group
and our three individually measured antecedents: perceived similarity to the
group (our proxy for social distance), perceived exposure of the group to the
message, and perceived predispositions of the group toward the behavior
advocated or discouraged by the message. Each regression is structured to
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control for demographic variables (gender, age, and race—White or non-
White) and perceived effects on the self.2 These are entered simultaneously
with the variables of interest: perceived similarity, perceived exposure, and
perceived predispositions.
First, we examine the results for cigarette advertising (see Table 2). Previ-
ously, we found that more distant comparison groups were perceived as more
affected by cigarette ads, in support of Hypothesis 3; however, we found little
support within each comparison group for the effect of perceived similarity
(our individual measure of social distance) on perceived effects. There were
no significant findings for eight of the nine cases. The exception was for the
public in general; the closer the respondents felt to the public, the less they
thought the public would be influenced by cigarette ads (β = –.19, p < .01).
Hypothesis 5 predicted that perceived exposure would be positively
related to perceived effects of cigarette ads, and this was largely the case. Sig-
nificant positive betas were found in eight of the nine cases, with betas
greater than .20 (p < .001). The exception was for 60-year-olds (β = .08, ns).
Research Question 1 asks about this relationship for the self: There is not one
(β = –.05, ns). Hypothesis 7 predicted that perceived predispositions toward
smoking would be positively related to perceived effects of cigarette ads. This
prediction was upheld for all 10 cases (all βs .17, all ps < .005).
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Table 2
Predictors of Perceived Effects of Cigarette Ads
Perceived Perceived Perceived
Perceived Effect on . . . Similarity Exposure Predisposition
Final β Final β Final β
Yourself NA –.05 .30***
Your friends –.04 .14** .23***
University students –.02 .28*** .18**
Public in general –.19*** .27*** .19***
Males –.10 .19*** .23***
Females –.08 .21*** .25***
16-year-olds –.06 .27*** .28***
People your age –.06 .20*** .22***
30-year-olds –.08 .26*** .20***
60-year-olds .06 .08 .17**
Note. N = 306 to 315. The above table shows standardized regression coefficients for 10 different
regression models, one for each row (self and the nine comparison groups). Perceived effects on each
group were controlled for the effects of the respondent’s gender, age, race, and perceived effects on
the self (the latter was not included in predicting perceived effects on self). Higher scores reflect
greater persuasion for cigarette ads.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Perceived Similarity, Exposure, and
Predispositions for Desirable Messages
Next we consider perceived effects for antitobacco ads (Table 3) and
drunk-driving PSAs (Table 4). Hypothesis 4, which passed the traditional
between-groups test, predicted that social distance would be negatively
related to perceived effects of these desirable messages. As operationalized
here, the prediction would be that as perceived similarity increases,we would
see lower scores on the effects measure (becoming less likely to smoke or
drive drunk). The expected result was seen for just three of the nine groups
when the message was drunk-driving PSAs. Furthermore, perceived similar-
ity had no significant relationship with effects of antitobacco messages. The
hypothesis receives little support.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that perceived exposure would be more strongly
related to perceived effects for cigarette ads than for antitobacco ads and
drunk-driving PSAs. We saw earlier (in Table 2) that perceived exposure was
positively related to perceived effects of cigarette advertising. For the desir-
able messages, the target corollary would have predicted that greater per-
ceived exposure of a group to a desirable message would lead to lower scores
on the effects measure (becoming less likely to smoke or drive drunk). A quick
look at the perceived exposure betas for these messages, however, shows only
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Table 3
Predictors of Perceived Effects of Antitobacco Ads
Perceived Perceived Perceived
Perceived Effect on . . . Similarity Exposure Predisposition
Final β Final β Final β
Yourself NA –.08 .40***
Your friends –.02 .05 .25***
University students –.01 .04 .23***
Public in general .00 .06 .25***
Males –.06 –.01 .23***
Females .00 –.02 .30***
16-year-olds –.07 –.04 .29***
People your age .02 .02 .26***
30-year-olds .05 –.07 .30***
60-year-olds .04 –.04 .31***
Note. N = 306 to 315. The above table shows standardized regression coefficients for 10 different
regression models, one for each row (self and the nine comparison groups). Perceived effects on each
group were controlled for the effects of the respondent’s gender, age, race, and perceived effects on
the self (the latter was not included in predicting perceived effects on self). Lower scores reflect
greater message-consistent persuasion for antitobacco ads.
***p < .001.
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two coefficients of 20 significant at p < .05, and those two have signs that run
counter to the expectations of the target corollary.
Perceived exposure’s relative lack of predictive power for desirable mes-
sages is suggestive; however, it is not sufficient to declare Hypothesis 6 sup-
ported. Next, z tests were conducted to compare perceived exposure’s regres-
sion coefficients for cigarette ads to its coefficients for the desirable messages
(Brame, Paternoster, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998). We computed z scores
using the unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors for
each comparison group; the signs of the coefficients for the desirable mes-
sages were changed so that like the ones for the cigarette ads, positive coeffi-
cients reflect a positive relationship with message-consistent effects (see
Table 5). In 16 of the 18 cases where the comparison group was other than the
self, the regression coefficient for perceived exposure was significantly
greater for cigarette ads than for antitobacco ads or drunk-driving PSAs.
Hypothesis 6 was largely supported. Perceived exposure was not related to
effects on self for the desirable messages, either, giving us another negative
answer to Research Question 1.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that perceived predispositions toward smoking
and drunk driving would be negatively related to perceived effects of
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Table 4
Predictors of Perceived Effects of Drunk-Driving PSAs
Perceived Perceived Perceived
Perceived Effect on . . . Similarity Exposure Predisposition
Final β Final β Final β
Yourself NA .01 .45***
Your friends –.10** .04 .15***
University students –.12* .03 .25***
Public in general –.05 .04 .28***
Males .05 .09 .30***
Females –.10 –.01 .25***
16-year-olds –.03 .02 .31***
People your age –.11* .13* .29***
30-year-olds .01 .13* .20***
60-year-olds –.01 .05 .30***
Note. PSAs = public service announcements. N = 306 to 315. The above table shows standardized
regression coefficients for 10 different regression models, one for each row (self and the nine com-
parison groups). Perceived effects on each group were controlled for the effects of the respondent’s
gender, age, race, and perceived effects on the self (the latter was not included in predicting per-
ceived effects on self). Lower scores reflect greater message-consistent persuasion for drunk-driv-
ing PSAs.
*p <.05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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here, the prediction would be that as perceived predispositions increase, we
would see higher scores on the effects measure (becoming more likely to
smoke or drive drunk). As the rightmost columns of Tables 3 and 4 show, this
relationship was found in all 20 cases, with betas ranging from .15 to .45 (all
ps < .001).
The second research question asks what the relative effects of perceived
similarity, perceived exposure, and perceived predispositions are. A glance at
the regressions suggests that perceived similarity plays little role in effects
for either desirable or undesirable messages, perceived exposure is a factor
for undesirable messages but not for desirable messages, and perceived pre-
dispositions are important in both cases. As an overall analysis, the mean
perceived effects for each group (including the self) and message were corre-
lated with the mean perceived similarity, exposure, and dispositions for each
group and message. The results confirm the above summary. Perceived simi-
larity has no significant relationships with perceived effects of cigarette ads,
antitobacco ads, or drunk-driving PSAs (r = .08, –.08, and –.10, respectively,
N = 9, ns). Perceived exposure was correlated with perceived effects of ciga-
rette ads (r = .90, N = 10, p < .001) but not antitobacco ads (r = .41, N = 10, ns)
or drunk-driving PSAs (r = .47, N = 10, ns). Perceived predispositions,
however, are related to perceived effects cigarette ads (r = .89, N = 10,
p < .001), antitobacco ads (r = .98, N = 10, p < .001), and drunk-driving
PSAs (r = .94, N = 10, p < .001).
Discussion
The current study set out to examine the roles of social distance, perceived
exposure, and perceived predispositions in the context of desirable and unde-
sirable messages. It confirmed the limitations of social distance, found a limi-
tation to perceived exposure, and put forth perceived predispositions as a fac-
tor that although often an implicit part of theorizing, deserves explicit
inclusion in models of perceived effects.
There is little to say about Hypothesis 1: Once again, a third-person effect
was found. First-person effects are somewhat more controversial; some stud-
ies have failed to find them,and David, Liu, and Myser (2004) argued that the
effect is an artifact of measurement. The current study was not designed to
refute that claim. However, it can be said that measurements designed to
reduce anchoring or comparison effects reduce third-person and first-person
effects; it is just that third-person effects are usually more robust to begin
with because motivations to respond optimally to the message and to main-
tain self-determination are in a consistent direction. That is not the case for
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first-person effects. Still, it could be said that the first-person effect was, if
anything,more consistent than the third-person effect in the current study.
The findings for social distance were split depending on whether a tradi-
tional across-group test or a within-group test (using individual measures of
perceived similarity) is used, a finding that mirrors those of Eveland et al.
(1999) and McLeod et al. (2001). Whereas groups that were less general and
more distant from the self were seen as more susceptible to cigarette ads and
less receptive to the desirable messages, the within-group tests were mostly
nonsignificant. Perceived similarity’s best showing was in the drunk-driving
PSAs condition, where it was a significant predictor of perceived effects for
the three groups (of 9) with the highest perceived similarity to the self.
Within-comparison-group tests arguably minimize the effect of social dis-
tance because they restrict its variance (e.g., most people are very close to
their friends; however, there is more variance in perceived similarity when
we compare friends and complete strangers). However, perceived predisposi-
tions are subject to similar restrictions and still show significant results.
Moreover, the across-group correlation still showed little relationship
between perceived similarity and perceived effects. Perceived similarity
appeared to be the weakest of the three independent variables considered
here.
Perceived exposure of comparison groups to the media content, the key
variable in the target corollary, showed a fairly consistent relationship with
perceived effects on others for cigarette advertising; this finding expands the
range of undesirable messages for which this phenomenon has been found
into the realm of advertising, where exposure is (usually) not by choice, as
opposed to music. However, two potential limitations to the target corollary
were found, one old, one new. The old one is that perceived exposure did not
predict perceived effects on the self, as McLeod et al. (2001) showed. People do
appear to employ different processes when forming effects estimates for the
self and others.
The new potential limitation to the target corollary is that as predicted, it
did not appear to hold for desirable, prosocial messages. In 16 of 18 cases, per-
ceived exposure had no relationship with perceived effects of antitobacco ads
and drunk-driving PSAs; in the other two cases, greater exposure to drunk-
driving PSAs was weakly related with greater likelihood to drink and drive.
Clearly, the simple heuristic of “exposure equals effects” does not apply here.
It may be that the schema of powerful media effects (Price, Huang, &
Tewksbury, 1997) does not apply to prosocial messages, that people think
such messages are ineffectual (however much they themselves claim to be
influenced by them).
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Here, however, we can point to another explanation: perceived predisposi-
tions. We see consistent evidence across antisocial and prosocial messages,
across self and nine comparison groups, that perceived predispositions are
related to perceived effects. In recent discussions of how effects estimates are
made, perceived predispositions have been implicitly recognized as impor-
tant; however, rarely have they been operationalized. It stands to reason that
messages advocating a behavior (say, cigarette advertising that advocates
smoking) would be perceived as more effective when a group is seen as being
predisposed toward that behavior.
Of course, the direction of causality is ambiguous. It would be just as easy
to argue that a group is seen as favorably disposed toward smoking because it
is seen as more affected by cigarette advertising. However, the reverse cau-
sality argument is harder to make for the prosocial messages precisely
because the target corollary does not apply for them. If people do not appear
to equate exposure with effects of these messages, it suggests that these mes-
sages are seen as relatively weak. Thus, in the respondents’ view, it is proba-
bly not prosocial messages’ effects driving predispositions; instead, these
weak but well-intentioned messages have their effects when they reach
already receptive minds (like their own).
Future research could help to address this causal tangle, perhaps with a
multistage experiment. Researchers may also wish to return to the area of
media schemas (Price et al., 1997),particularly the notion that prosocial mes-
sages are seen as relatively ineffectual. Although this idea has been men-
tioned as a possibility (Perloff, 1999), no one has empirically explored it.
The current study has several limitations. Chief among them is common:
the sample, drawn by convenience from undergraduates at one institution.
Generalizing from means found here is not recommended; generalizations
based on relationships found here can be made, but with caution. Demo-
graphic variables such as age or education, for instance, may have more of an
effect when there is more variance in them than this sample had. The current
study dealt with only three types of media content, two of which were
prosocial. There are reasons not to assume that the relationships found here
would apply to all prosocial content; for instance, exposure to antitobacco ads
and drunk-driving PSAs is usually unplanned and not by choice. Likewise, it
may be possible that the differences in predictors observed between cigarette
ads on one hand and antitobacco ads and drunk-driving PSAs on the other
reflect some dimension other than desirability. Future researchers would do
well to replicate the current research for other messages, respondents, and
comparison groups.
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Notes
1. Please direct all correspondence concerning this article to Patrick C. Meirick,
Department of Communication, University of Oklahoma, 610 Elm Ave., Norman, OK
73019; e-mail: meirick@ou.edu.
2. The latter is one point of departure with the tests employed by Eveland,
Nathanson, Detenber, & McLeod (1999), which the current study otherwise attempted
to follow. Results without perceived effects on self are quite similar except that there
were no significant coefficients for perceived similarity when regressed on the desir-
able messages. Betas for perceived effects on self were highest for the your friends
group (.52, .70, and .75 for cigarette ads, antitobacco ads, and drunk-driving Public Ser-
vice Announcements, respectively) and lowest for the 16-year-olds group (.11, .11, and
.20, respectively). Except for the two lowest betas for the 16-year-olds, all coefficients
were significant at p < .001. Obviously, perceived effects on self were not used in the
regression predicting perceived effects on self.
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